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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of firm exit in emerging economy of Kazakhstan. 
Using cross-sectional data of all legal entities in Kazakhstan, I show that mature firms (5-
10 years) are more likely to fail than young (0-5 years) and old firms (10 years and more). 
I confirm for the case of Kazakhstan the widely-established results for developed and 
most of the developing countries that bigger firms are less likely to exit. By controlling 
for competition, I find that firms in the major cities of Kazakhstan are more likely to exit, 
and by controlling for technology, I find that an old firm in the Mining or Agriculture 
industries is equally likely to exit as the young firm. These higher risks of exit are 
significantly dampened for partially or fully state-owned enterprises.  
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1. Introduction 
Kazakhstan is one of the largest and strongest economies in Central Asia, generating 60% 
of the region’s GDP, mainly due to the oil and gas industry and high prices of oil in the 
past. According to the National Statistics Agency, Kazakhstan’s economy grew at an 
average rate of 8% per year until 2013. In 2014, the economy grew by 4.6%, which can 
be associated with falling oil prices. Since then the country has devalued its currency by 
19% in February 2014 and in August 2015 the national currency was set free to float, 
which resulted in another series of devaluations. Despite the series of adverse shocks, the 
statistics show an unexpected trend. According to the National Statistics Agency of 
Kazakhstan, the number of firms registered was increasing, as shown in table 1. For 
instance, compared to 2015, more than 18,000 new firms have registered in 2016. 
Table 1. Number of firms entering and exiting the market by year 
This can be rationalized in a several ways; the currency devaluation has made the products 
produced inside cheaper for export, which stimulated the entrepreneurial activity of the 
country. Furthermore, a major part of the economy constitutes the service and distribution 
industries, the products of which cannot be really exported, but for which there may be 
high domestic demand as the economy is evolving towards a full-fledged market 
economy. While the number of new firms entering has increased, we also can observe 
that the number of firms exiting the industry has also been increasing (see table 1) 
recently. Firm dynamics and in particular the process of entry and exit is important if an 
Date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 1 Oct 2016
Total number of registered firms 301 372 317 926 338 981 353 833 360 287 379 934
Number of firms registered in a year 16 613 17 688 21 056 22 387 21 651 18 074
Number of firms declared bankrupt in a year 128 201 417 406 683 1 220
Number of firms declared inactive in a year 9 791 5 844 4 612 7 131 5 500 7 224
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economy wants to increase its efficiency and hence growth, through a Schumpeterian 
process of creative destruction. However, in emerging economies, like Kazakhstan, it is 
often argued that such an entry and exit process has been dampened due to the limited 
amount of competition, soft budget constraints and the dominance of state-owned 
enterprises (e.g. Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski, 2005). It is, therefore, important 
to assess how this firm dynamics and in particular the process of firm exit takes place and 
whether the typical market economic drivers that usually govern exit are also present in 
an emerging economy like Kazakhstan.  
The focus of this master thesis is hence on firm exit, which I first define as follows: The 
firm exits the market when it is declared bankrupt or inactive. The firm might also exit 
the market on its own, which would be a liquidation. I will relax my definition of exit to 
analyze whether exit as a result of bankruptcy or inactivity is driven by different factors 
than exit driven by liquidation. 
This paper is organized as follows, section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature, section 3 describes the data used, section 4 presents the results and discussion, 
and section 5 draws the conclusion. Section 6 provides possible improvements to be made 
in the future.        
 
2. Literature Review 
One of the first papers that have inspired a lot of work on analyzing firm dynamics and 
exit is Jovanovic (1982), which develops a model of passive learning. In particular, firms 
learn about their efficiency as they operate in the industry, efficient firms grow and 
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survive, inefficient firms decline and fail. In a related paper by Hopenhayn (1992) the 
author explains that firms exit when they experience a series of adverse productivity 
shocks. Currency devaluation, which happened in Kazakhstan several times in 2014-
2015, is a good example of an external factor that could be related to these adverse 
productivity shocks. Another theoretical framework is given by Ericson and Pakes 
(1995), where one of the main conclusions was that young firms tend to be smaller than 
average and to exit more frequently. Since the overall distribution of firms remains stable, 
it must be the case that to maintain a stable firm distribution, the firm entry must be 
correlated with exit. In fact, works performed on U.S. data concludes that entry and exit 
rates are correlated and that older and larger firms are less likely to fail (Dunne, Roberts, 
and Samuelson (1988, 1989)). More recent work by Aleksanyan and Huiban (2016) 
shows firms in the French food industry with a significantly negative relationship between 
firm’s probability to exit and its individual efficiency and age. Individual efficiencies of 
firms are measured in comparison of estimated firms’ productivity levels. These papers 
validate the well-known results in developed countries. 
Several papers that focus on developing countries reveal additional insights about firm 
survival. Roberts and Tybout (1996) have concluded based on observed sizable exit rates 
in Chile, Colombia, and Morocco, that in the short run the firms that replace old firms are 
only slightly more productive, however, in the long run the productivity increases 
substantially because the new firms that survive record significant productivity gains in 
the early years. In the case of Indian computer hardware industry, Das and Srinivasan 
(1997) conclude with results consistent with previous papers on developed countries, that 
exit is concentrated in smaller and younger plants. Liedholm, McPherson, and Chuta 
(1994) concluded that firm’s exit in Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and 
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Kenya is only partly related to business reasons. Political factors and soft budget 
constraints for government affiliated firms can play a role in determining firm’s survival 
chances. This result contradicts the literature on developed countries. McPherson (1995) 
in another paper concluded that size of the enterprise has no significant effect on the 
firm’s survival chances in Swaziland or Botswana and that larger firms are actually less 
likely to survive in Zimbabwe. Work that is more recent looks at the manufacturing sector 
of Ghana and shows evidence that less productive firms do not survive in the Ghanaian 
economic environment (Frazer (2005)). Unfortunately, their result cannot be extended to 
all African countries. Therefore, the results, obtained for developed countries, cannot be 
applied to developing countries. I also conclude that results for one developing country 
or region cannot be generalized for other regions or even industries in the same region.  
In the current study, I establish the determinants of firm exit in Kazakhstan and lay out 
the groundwork for the study of firm exit in CIS or former USSR countries. Paper by 
Roberts and Thompson (2003) looks at the firm entry and exit in Poland economy, which 
like CIS or former USSR countries moved from predominantly state-owned productive 
system, and concludes that entry and exit patterns closely correspond to those of more 
mature market economies. As Liedholm, McPherson, and Chuta (1994), I show that firm 
exit chances in Kazakhstan are related to non-business reasons, such as that government 
affiliation significantly reduces the likelihood of firm exit in Kazakhstan. I also look at 
the three types of state-owned enterprises and determine that fully state-owned enterprises 
are less likely to exit than partially state-owned firms. Also, I confirm the results for the 
case of Kazakhstan, that younger and smaller firms are more likely to exit the market. 
Additionally, I discover industry-region effect on the likelihood of firm exit.    
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3. Data Description 
For my analysis, I use the cross-sectional firm micro-level data from the National 
Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan1 and from the State Revenue Committee 
of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan2. For clarification purposes, 
when I am referring to the firm, I am referring to all legal entities registered in 
Kazakhstan. This data set does not include self-employed people. On October 1, 2016, 
there were 379 934 firms in Kazakhstan. I consider firm exit when the firm has gone 
bankrupt or declared inactive. I pool these types of exit together, because both types of 
firms are not contributing to the economy. The firm that fails to meet its contractual 
obligations goes through the bankruptcy procedure, which might take several years to 
implement. In the model, I use the official date of the court decision on bankruptcy as a 
bankruptcy date. The State Revenue Committee declares the firms that report zero 
revenue and cost for more than a year inactive. The data on bankruptcy and inactive firms 
was obtained from the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan.  Firm characteristics, such as firm identifiers, registration dates, 
locations, economic activity codes and intervals of the number of employees was obtained 
from the National Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. During the data 
collection and merging of five different data sources, some of the observations had 
missing values. The observations with missing values were omitted and left out of the 
dataset. It is assumed that missing values were selected at random and therefore do not 
                                                             
1 Portal Home. Accessed April 15, 2017. http://stat.gov.kz/. 
2 http://kgd.gov.kz/ru/section/reabilitaciya-i-bankrotstvo 
   http://kgd.gov.kz/ru/services/taxpayer_search_liquid  
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affect accuracy and unbiasedness of the results. Omitted observations constitute 6.5% of 
the dataset, and since the dataset is large enough, the accuracy of the results is maintained.               
Each firm in the data is identified by its unique twelve-digit code, called BIN. In total 
there are 355 013 firms in the data set. For each firm, I have information on the number 
interval of employees working for that firm. This KRP classification of the firm size is 
given in the table 2.  
Table 2. KRP classification 
 
In the model, I classify the size of the firm based on the number of employees working 
for that firm. Firms are grouped into Small, Medium and Large, and the table below shows 
a standard classification3 used generally in Kazakhstan. 
Table 3. Firm size classification 
 
The shortcoming of the above classification is that it does not take into account the profits 
made by the firm, and according to Kazakhstan legislation, the firms are also classified 
                                                             
3 "Об утверждении Инструкции по государственной регистрации юридических лиц и учетной 
регистрации филиалов и представительств." Электронное правительство Республики Казахстан. 
Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://egov.kz/wps/portal/!ut/p/b0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjc7PyChKtUvKTS3NT80r0w_Wj9KN
gPM8U_cgwA3MDAwMTMyPTeJBUTmJeemlieqp-ZFGpfkFurkW5o6IiAJwEvio!/#z8. 
KRP 100 105 110 120 130 140 150 200 210 215 220 225 300 305 310 311
# of 
employees
 0 - 50 <= 5  6 - 10  11 - 20  21 - 30  31 - 40  41 - 50  51 - 250  51 - 100  101 - 150  151 - 200 201 - 250 > 250  251 - 500  501 - 1000 > 1000
Small Medium Large
KRP 100 200 300
# of 
employees
 0 - 50  51 - 250 > 250
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based on their profits. If they exceed a certain profit level, they must register as a firm of 
another type. The literature suggests (e.g. Melitz (2000)) that productivity of the firm is 
correlated with the average number of employees; therefore, the firm size classification 
based on the number of employees seems logical. Table 4 shows the frequency table by 
the firm sizes, it is observed that 97.3% of the firms are small. High concentration of 
small firms can be explained by the government attempts to propel SME sector, by 
simplifying the firm registration procedure4.    
Table 4. Frequency table by firm size 
 
Another important identifier is the OKED code, which groups the firms according to their 
economic activity. This classification is similar to the NACE 4-digit classification. The 
OKED codes are grouped into sections of economic activity, as shown in table 5. Most 
firms are concentrated in the wholesale and retail trade industries. Second largest 
industry, is the construction industry.   
 
 
 
                                                             
4"Об утверждении Инструкции по государственной регистрации юридических лиц и учетной 
регистрации филиалов и представительств." Электронное правительство Республики Казахстан. 
Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://egov.kz/wps/portal/!ut/p/b0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjc7PyChKtUvKTS3NT80r0w_Wj9
KNgPM8U_cgwA3MDAwMTMyPTeJBUTmJeemlieqp-ZFGpfkFurkW5o6IiAJwEvio!/#z8. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Small 345 446 97,31% 97,31%
Medium 6 644 1,87% 99,18%
Large 2 923 0,82% 100,00%
Total 355 013 100,00%
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Table 5. Economic activity classification 
 
Since the problem of firm entry and exit is likely to depend on the nature of competition 
and the technology that prevails, I distinguish between the different sectors in the 
economy. Typically levels of competition vary across sectors, therefore for my analysis, 
I need to capture the effects of Manufacturing/Construction, Services, and 
Mining/Agriculture industries. Economic activities sectors were grouped accordingly as 
shown in table 6.  
Section Economic activity
A Agriculture, forestry and fishery
B Mining and quarrying
C Processing industry
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
E Water supply; sewerage system, control over the collection and distribution of waste
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H Transportation and warehousing
I Accommodation and catering services
J Information & Communication
K Financial and insurance activities
L Retail estate operations
M Professional, scientific and technical activities
N Administrative and Suport services
O Public administration and defense; compulsory social security
P Education
Q Healthcare and social services
R Arts, entertainment and recreation
S Other services
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Table 6. Industry classification 
 
As shown in the table 10, the Service industry contains the most number of firms, with 
Manufacturing/Construction industry being second largest. Mining/Agriculture industry 
being the smallest is interesting, since most of the country revenue comes from taxes on 
this sector5 and the firms in this sector earn the highest profits on average. This can be 
explained by the barriers to entry, such as high governmental involvement, which leads 
to almost monopolistic market conditions. The rise in the Manufacturing sector can be 
associated with government attempts for import substitution6.  
As was mentioned in the literature review section, regional effects play a significant role 
on the performance of the firm, especially together with industry type. I would expect that 
an agricultural firm in the south of Kazakhstan has better chances of surviving than a 
manufacturing firm because of the favorable climate conditions for agricultural activity 
in the south. In my dataset, KATO identifier groups the firms based on locations. 
Kazakhstan consists of sixteen regional districts. I group these districts into six regions 
                                                             
5http://kgd.gov.kz/ru/content/perechen-krupnyh-nalogoplatelshchikov-podlezhashchih-monitoringu-1 
http://www.kursiv.kz/news/top_ratings/Kormiltsy_nashi_30_krupneyshikh_nalogoplatelshchikov_Kazak
hstana/ 
6"Стратегии и программы Республики Казахстан." Стратегии и программы Республики Казахстан — 
Официальный сайт Президента Республики Казахстан. Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/strategies_and_programs. 
Manufacturing/                      
Construction
C,F,J
Services D,E,G,H,I,K,M,N,O,P,Q,R,S
Mining/Agriculture A,B
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as shown below. From table 7 it is seen that capital cities are the attraction of most firms. 
The second largest region by the number firms is South of Kazakhstan.  
Table 7. Distribution of districts by regions 
 
Another variable of interest is the number of firms that are affiliated with the government. 
The dataset contains 22 090 firms that are partially or fully owned by the government. I 
divide them into three subgroups: firms where the government owns all 100% of the firm, 
firms where the government owns the majority of the firm (50% or more), and firms 
where the government owns a minority of the firm (less than 50%). In table 8 it is 
observed that most firms where the government holds a share are fully owned by the 
government and they are of medium or large size on average. On the contrast, the entire 
industry is dominated by small firms (97%). 
Table 8. Distribution of government-affiliated firms 
 
Regions Districts Number of firms
South Kyzylorda, Shymkent, Zhambyl, Taldykorgan 78 092
North Petropavlovsk, Pavlodar, Akmola, Kostanay 54 499
Central Karaganda 29 025
East Semey 23 079
West Aktau, Atyrau, Mangistau, Aktobe 54 476
Capital cities Almaty, Astana 115 842
Share of the firm owned 
by government
Number 
of firms
Average size 
Fully (100 %) 21 472 Medium
Majority (>50 %) 212 Large
Minority (<50 %) 406 Medium
Total 22 090
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The bankruptcy and inactivity data is organized as a binary variable. If the firm exits the 
market during the whole period, it is one, and zero otherwise. Firm inactivity is the type 
of firm exit, which dominates it. From table 10 it is observed, that there are much more 
inactive firms than bankrupt. Exit rate due to inactivity is 14.52%, when the exit rate due 
to bankruptcy is only 0.9%. Overall exit is 15.21%, which is relatively high when 
comparing to countries in Europe where the average firm exit rate is 6.3%7.  
The date of exit is recorded as another variable and together with the registration date, the 
age of the firm is computed. In my analysis, I group all firms into three groups: firms that 
are younger than 5 years old, firms that are older than 5 and younger than 10 years old, 
and firms that are older than 10 years old. The table below shows firms distribution by 
age group. 
Table 9. Age group distribution of the firms 
 
It is seen from table 10 that the most number of firm exits is in the Service industry and 
the biggest proportion of exits is in the Manufacturing / Construction industry. The 
attempts8 of the government to stimulate the manufacturing and processing industry by 
                                                             
7 Eurostat Business Demography Statistics, manufacturing sector, "Business demography statistics - 
Statistics Explained." Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://www.bing.com/cr?IG=DC35474DAEAB449FB3D797F9E2535FBC&CID=29BFDD560B7D6847
318FD7330AED69DC&rd=1&h=VA5JtjQOanZfqH_uUOX4ZZjORYz7m1KcMT2DSsDBBm8&v=1&r
=http%3a%2f%2fec.europa.eu%2feurostat%2fstatistics-
explained%2findex.php%2fBusiness_demography_statistics&p=DevEx,5063.1. 
8 http://akorda.kz/upload/%D0%93%D0%9F%D0%98%D0%98%D0%A0%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%202015-
2019%20%D0%B3%D0%B3.doc 
Age group of the firm
Number 
of firms
Young (0 to 5 yeas) 118 503
Mature (5 to 10 years) 93 375
Old (10 years and more) 143 135
Total 355 013
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increasing government spending on manufacturing and processing plants leads to 
appearance of many one-time firms, which often shutdown soon after the benefits of the 
government programs stop. 
Table 10. Overall summary statistics by industry sector 
 
Table 11 shows summary statistics by firm size. It is seen that most number of firm exits 
is between small firms. On average, the firm in Kazakhstan is expected to exit after 9 
years. This trend is mostly driven by small firms. The exit rate is the highest among small 
firms, which supports literature claims made earlier for developed countries. 
Table 11. Overall summary statistics by firm size 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
As Jovanovic (1982) suggested and Ericson and Pakes (1995) supported, firm’s exit 
depends on firm’s age and size. This relationship holds true for developed and most of 
the developing countries as was shown in the literature review section. Therefore, I 
include them in my model as well. Liedholm, McPherson, and Chuta (1994) showed that 
Industry # of firms Bankruptcy % Inactivity % Exit rate % Firm age (years)
Manufacturing/                      
Construction
77 922 1,39% 16,61% 17,68% 8,17
Services 260 250 0,72% 14,16% 14,71% 9,22
Mining/Agriculture 16 841 1,88% 10,55% 11,54% 9,52
Total 355 013 0,89% 14,52% 15,21% 9
Size # of firms Bankruptcy % Inactivity % Exit rate % Firm age (years)
Small 345 446 0,90% 14,91% 15,60% 8,89
Medium 6 644 0,48% 0,72% 1,16% 13,61
Large 2 923 0,55% 0,58% 0.99% 12,18
Total 355 013 0,89% 14,52% 15,21% 9
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firm exit can be related to non-business reasons (government forced them to close, soft 
budget constraints (Kornai (1979))). Therefore, I explore the government affiliation factor 
in the model. In addition, as I have already mentioned, it is important to capture industry 
and regional effects to control for external factors such as competition and technology. 
At the end, the model of interest to us looks as follows.  
𝑃(𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 , 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
I use probit estimation technique since the probability of exit is the dependent variable. 
The literature suggests that as the size or age of the firm increases the probability of the 
firm going bankrupt decreases and this holds true in case of Kazakhstan as well.  
 
4.1 Baseline Results  
The baseline results of the probit regressions for the entire population of the firms are 
shown in the table 12. The results table consists of four models, where each model is the 
extension of the previous model. The model 1 includes the age of the firm as the only 
independent variable. The model 2 extends the model 1 by the addition of the dummy 
variable for the size of the firm. The results of the model 1 suggest that initially as firm 
matures the probability of the firm exit increases. As the firm reaches certain maturity 
age in the range between 5 to 10 years, its likelihood of exit is much lower. Firms that are 
10 years old or more are less likely to fail than young firms. In the model 2 addition of 
the firm size, shows that medium and large firms are less likely fail than small firms, 
which is consistent with the Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989). As McPherson 
(1995) suggested, addition of the regional effects shows in model 3 that firms in North of 
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Kazakhstan are less likely to fail and that firms in the capital cities are more likely to fail. 
Higher risks in the capital cities are associated with higher competition. This trend is like 
a shakeout of firms due to competition pressure. Results of the model 4 suggest that firms 
with government share in them are much less likely to fail than private firms, and firms 
that are fully government owned have the greatest certainty of not exiting the market. 
This result contradicts the results of Frazer (2005), where he states that state-owned 
enterprises in Ghana are capital intensive, and therefore are more likely to exit.   
Evidence from Kazakhstan supports the relationship between firm size and age on the 
firm’s exit chances. In general, I can also say that government support significantly 
improves the firm’s survival chances. Firm’s location matters in determining its exit 
chances, with firms in the west and capital cities having the least chances to survive. High 
risks in these regions are dampened for partially or fully state-owned enterprises. Table12 
indicates that general effect of firm age and size remains robust across various 
specifications.             
4.2 Results by Industry Sector 
Next, I take the effects of the industry into account to control for technology. The similar 
analysis is performed for the firms working in the Manufacturing/Construction, Services 
and Mining/Agriculture sectors. The results are shown in the tables 13, 14 and 15. 
According to table 13, the model 1 shows a similar trend with respect to age of the firm. 
Firms in the manufacturing industry that are 10 years old are much less likely to exit the 
market. From model 2 it is seen that larger firms are less likely to exit. When looking at 
the regions, it is observed that manufacturing/construction firms in the west, central and 
capital cities of Kazakhstan are more likely to fail than in the rest of Kazakhstan. Model 
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4 shows that government affiliation in manufacturing/construction sector does not help 
companies to stay afloat. Only firms that are fully owned by the government have 
statistically different odds of exiting. Other government supported organizations in 
manufacturing/construction have the same odds of failing as the rest of the market. 
Table13 indicates that effect of firm age and size in Manufacturing/Construction industry 
remains robust across various specifications.               
The survival chances of a firm in Manufacturing/Construction sector of Kazakhstan 
depend on its location. Manufacturing and construction firms in capital cities account for 
37 percent of the entire manufacturing and construction industry. Therefore, high exit 
chances in capital cities could be due to high competition. West and central Kazakhstan 
have a lot of processing plants (oil and mineral processing). This industry is known for 
its high costs and since the world prices for their products in 2016-2017 were falling, it 
was hard to stay on the market. Therefore, these all could be a potential reason for high 
exit rates in these regions. Even partial government affiliation does not help companies 
to stay competitive because the government is not capable of controlling the world 
market. For example, huge currency devaluation could hurt the manufacturing and 
construction industries, because of the dependence on the imports. Only fully government 
supported organizations are safer, and only because there is not much of them in general 
and because those organizations most of the time serve a strategic purpose for the 
government, therefore softening their budget constraints.  
As can be seen from the model 1 and model 2 of table 14, Service industry is no different 
than the rest of the market with respect to age or size of the firm. Older firms are much 
less likely to exit than younger firms. Model 3 shows that firms in Service industry from 
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Central and capital cities of Kazakhstan are more likely to fail than firms from South and 
West of Kazakhstan. Also, firms from North of Kazakhstan are less likely to exit the 
Service industry. The fully government-supported firms and firms with a minor share of 
the government in the service industry are much more stable.    
High exit probability among firms in Service industry in Capital cities is likely due to 
high competition. Capital cities account for 33 percent of the entire service industry. 
According to the National Statistics Agency9 people have been migrating from Central 
and East of Kazakhstan for the last 10 years. At the same time, capital cities were rapidly 
increasing. Some of these people were entrepreneurs in Service industry. Even though I 
cannot show a causal relationship, these are possible explanations for higher than average 
exit chances in Central, East and capital cities of Kazakhstan. Table14 indicates that effect 
of firm age and size in Service industry remains robust across various specifications.                
For Mining and Agriculture sector as shown in table 15, the probability of exit is the 
highest among firms that are 5 to 10 years old.  Young and old firms statistically have the 
same odds of failing. Similar to other industries, larger firms are less likely to exit the 
market. Model 3 tells us that firms in the Mining and Agriculture industry from the north 
of Kazakhstan are less likely to fail than the rest of Kazakhstan. Firms in this sector that 
are fully or partially (minority share) owned by the government have significantly fewer 
chances of exiting the market. Firms where the government holds the majority of the 
shares is no different than the rest of the market. 
                                                             
9Негізгі әлеуметтік-экономикалық көрсеткiштердің серпіні. Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://stat.gov.kz/faces/homePage/homeDinamika.pokazateli?_afrLoop=17834534190120148#%40%3F
_afrLoop%3D17834534190120148%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D1cq8027zu_63. 
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Mining and Agriculture industries show an unexpected trend with respect to the age of 
the firm. It contradicts the literature on this topic. Older firms having the same survival 
odds as the young firms can be explained by the world economic downturn of 2014-2015. 
A lot of old firms that were enjoying high oil profits, were hit hard by the oil crisis. Since 
oil rents accounted for about 30% of country GDP, the decline in this sector could force 
old and once stable firms out of the market. North of Kazakhstan is known for growing 
wheat, and due to 2014-2015 devaluations its export increases. This would explain 
advantages of agricultural firms in the North of Kazakhstan. Table15 indicates that effect 
of firm age and size in Mining/Agriculture industry remains robust across various 
specifications.           
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Table 12. Probit results for entire industry 
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Table 13. Probit results for Manufacturing/Construction industry 
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Table 14. Probit results for Service industry 
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Table 15. Probit results for Mining/Agriculture industry 
23 
 
5. Conclusion 
This is the first paper exploring the determinants of firm exit in Kazakhstan and it serves 
as a foundation for future work to be conducted on other CIS or former USSR countries. 
Several conclusions can be made. Bigger and older firms in Kazakhstan are less likely to 
exit because of the bankruptcy or long inactivity of the firm. Firms that are affiliated with 
government are a much less likely fail. This result contradicts Frazer (2005) that 
government supported organizations are actually more likely to exit. Evidence from 
Kazakhstan explains why most of the foreign investors that enter the market in 
Kazakhstan seek government affiliations in the form of joint ventures. This is a form of 
risk minimization for them. By including the regional dummies, it is concluded that major 
cities of Kazakhstan, Astana, and Almaty, and West of Kazakhstan are the markets where 
firms are most likely to exit in Kazakhstan. West of Kazakhstan is the black gold mine 
that used to generate most of the country’s revenue in the past. High likelihood of exit in 
this region can be explained by high competition and unfavorable external conditions, 
such as oil price drop. Capturing industry effects, it is concluded that external oil price 
shocks affected firm’s exit in the Mining industry of Kazakhstan. The fact that older firms 
in the Mining industry are equally likely to exit as the young firms, points to the fact that 
mining industry heavily depends on the world market condition.       
The limitations of this work are that the size classification of the firm does not take into 
account firm’s productivity, which in reality is regulated by the government through 
profit caps for each firm type. Also, the data does not include the firms which were 
liquidated on their own. The model also can be reorganized to perform panel data 
analysis, in order to capture the effect external shocks, such as currency devaluations.     
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6. Future Work 
In my Ph.D. studies, I will reconfigure the model into panel data in order to investigate 
the effect of external shocks. The goal is to gather sufficient information to track yearly 
changes happening to the firms. I will add the yearly taxes of firms as a proxy for the 
firm’s productivity.  
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